Intervista sulla crisi greca alla radio della svizzera italiana

qui oppure qui


http://reteuno.rsi.ch/modem/welcome.cfm?IDc=40891



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Nadine with models

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Bankers' conflicts of interest in the interwar years: Lessons for today’s regulators

My (joint with Marc Flandreau and Norbert Gaillard) new piece on VOX

The global crisis is frequently compared to the Great Depression and the interwar debt crises. This column argues that, contrary to prevailing opinion, the interwar debt crisis had little to do with bankers’ conflicts of interest – intermediaries were in fact careful in selecting and placing sovereign bonds. Then, as now, public opinion may not be the best guide to policy The rest is here

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Me on the Economist

Eduardo Borensztein and Ugo Panizza counts as many as 257 sovereign defaults between 1824 and 2004. Between 1981 and 1990 alone, there were 74 defaults....Messrs Borensztein and Panizza show that having defaulted is associated with a credit-rating downgrade of nearly two notches.....That said, markets appear to have short memories. Only the most recent defaults matter and the effects on spreads are short-lived. Messrs Borensztein and Panizza find that credit ratings between 1999 and 2002 were affected only by defaults since 1995.....Messrs Borensztein and Panizza find that a defaulting country grows by 1.2 percentage points less per year while its debt is being restructured compared with a similar country that is not in default. This effect, too, is concentrated in the first year after default. Once again, measuring from the point of default will somewhat understate the damage: defaults tend to occur during recessions, so GDP is already depressed when a country reneges...Another element to the costs of default may also alarm Greek policymakers. Messrs Borensztein and Panizza find that political leadership changed in the year of default or the year after in half of the 22 cases they study. That is twice the usual probability of such change. These political costs, at least, are unlikely to vary.

The rest is Here

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